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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A. ISAACSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLAIR DORIUS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
LAWRENCE W. LYNN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLAIR DORIUS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 18166 
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action the plaintiffs and respondents sought 
damages for personal injury and property damages from the defend-
ant arising out 'of a collision between an automobile driven by 
the plaintiff-respondent, Lawrence W. Lynn, in which plaintiff-
respondent, Richard A. Isaacson, was traveling as a passenger, 
and a pickup truck driven by the defendant-appellant, Clair 
Darius. The case on behalf of each plaintiff was brought as 
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a separate action and the cases were consolidated for trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the trial, after all parties had rested, Judge 
Tibbs granted respondents' motion for a directed verdict on the 
issue of liability, thereby determining that the defendant-
appellant was negligent and his negligence the proximate cause 
of the collision as a matter of law, and determining that the 
plaintiffs-respondents were not negligent and that there con-
duct was not a proximate cause of the collision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-respondents seek to have the decision of 
the Trial Court affirmed. 
Plaintiffs-respondents also assert that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction of this appeal for the reason that defendant-
appellant did not timely file Notice of Appeal. This matter was 
raised earlier in this Court by motion of respondents seeking 
dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court 
denied the motion without prejudice to that issue being raised 
as an issue on appealo 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arose out of an automobile collision 
between a vehicle driven by the plaintiff, Lawrence W. Lynn, in 
which plaintiff, Richard A. Isaacson, was a passenger, and a 
pickup truck driven by the defendant. The collision occurred 
on Highway SR28, conunonly known as U. S. Highway 189, just north 
of Fayette, Utah, at a place on said highway where a dirt road 
leading from Fayette crosses said highway and proceeds on to a 
cemetery located on the east side of the highway. Prior to the 
collision the plaintiffs were proceeding north on Highway SR28 
(the arterial highway) and the defendant was proceeding east ori 
the dirt road. Travelers on the dirt road are required to stop 
at the stop sign before proceeding out onto Highway SR28. The 
defendant testified that he·did not stop at the stop sign, and 
that he at no time saw the vehicle driven by the plaintiffs. 
(Tr:284) That defendant's actions were negligent and constituted 
a proximate cause of the collision is conceded by the defendant 
(Defendant's brief, page 6)0 Defendant, however, contends that 
plaintiff Lynn was also negligent on the basis that there was 
some evidence plaintiff's vehicle was going 65 miles per hour on 
a 55 miles per hour highway (Appellant's brief, page 7) and in 
allegedly failing to keep a proper lookout (Appellant's brief, 
page 7). 
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The facts relating to the foregoing assertions are as 
follows: 
SPEED: The only testimony in this action with r_espect 
to speed came from plaintiff Lynn and from Highway Patrolman David 
Bailey (who was qualified at the trial as an accident reconstruc-
tion expert) (Tr: 64-66). 
Plaintiff Lynn testified that at the time of the col-
lision he was traveling 55 miles per hour. He testified that 
shortly after he and plaintiff Isaacson left Richfield, he set 
the cruise control on his 1979 Lincoln automobile at 55 miles ,, 
per hour and that it remained at that setting until he applied 
his brakes after he observed that defendant was not going to 
stop for the stop sign as noted above (Tr: 289-80). Plaintift_Lynn 
testified that as soon as he saw that defendant was not going to 
stop at the stop sign he immediately applied his brakes, causing 
his vehicle to go into a skid which continued until the collision 
between the two vehicles and even beyond. (Tr :28]) . 
Trooper Bailey testified that from measurements taken 
at the scene of the collision and from calculations applied there-
to, he determined he was able to arrive at "approximations" of 
speed. (Tr:74). He concluded that the plaintiff's vehicle was 
traveling approximately 65 miles per hour at a point which he 
described as "the point of perception: (Tr:74,94) but that the 
formula shed no light on speed prior to that point. (Tr:94). 
He testified that the perception time is approximately 3/4's of 
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of a second (Tr:83), during which time, at 65 miles an hour, the 
plaintiff's vehicle traveled approximately 74 feet (Tr:84). Offi-
cer Bailey testified that there was an average of 81 feet of skid 
marks prior to impact ~nd an average of 43 feet after (Tr:68). He 
therefore concluded that there were approximately 155 feet trav-
eled by the Lynn vehicle from point of perception to point of 
impact. He testified that the defendant's vehicle was traveling, 
at the time of the impact, approximately 18 miles per hour, which 
he testified was 26 feet per second (Tr:73,87) and that the dis-
tance between the front bumper of defendant's vehicle at impact 
and the stop sign through which the said vehicle had passed was 
59 feet (Tr:85). He stated that the defendant would have been 
traveling (at 18 miles per hour) for approximately 2.2 seconds 
from the time he proceeded past the stop sign to the point of 
impact (Tr:91). Trooper Bailey testified that at 65 miles per 
hour plaintiff's vehicle would travel 95 feet per second and at 
55 miles per hour it would have traveled 80 feet per second 
(Tr: 81). 
There was no testimony as to the coefficient of fric-
tion on the highway nor as to what other changes, if any, in the 
aforesaid reconstruction data would be brought about by a change 
in speed in relation to skid distance and/or time and the like. 
Trooper Bailey testified that in his opinion the speed 
of the Lynn vehicle was not a cause of the collision, but to the 
contrary, the cause of the collision was defendant's failure to 
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heed the stop sign. Trooper Bailey states at page 78'of the 
transcript: 
"In my opinion the cause of the accident was that 
Vehicle #2 (the defendant's truck) did not stop at the 
stop sign and proceeded into an unsafe intersection." 
Defendant claims no error for this question and answer 
on appeal. 
At pages 79 and 80 of the transcript Trooper Bailey 
testified: 
"Q What I'm trying to say is: When you're talking 
about going 65 miles an hour contributed as a cause 
to this accident, whether it would not have happened 
if he was going faster or slower? You have to have 
some other factors in there; don't you? 
"A You have to have time. You have to figure in 
time equations, yes. 
"Q But I'm just saying if you'd been going 45 ten 
miles under the speed limit, or 65, ten miles over 
the speed limit, would Vehicle 1 constituted a hazard 
along that highway that whoever was approaching that 
stop sign should have stopped for? 
"A Yes. I would say he should have stopped for it." 
Trooper Bailey testified on redirect by Mr. Madsen at 
page 93 of the transcript as follows: 
"Q But then, again, we get into matters of the 
point of perception it has when braking begins and 
so on and there was not just a simple change in 
speeds; is that correct? 
"A Yes. 
"Q So it's impossible to say, as I have asked you 
originally, whether this accident would have or 
wouldn't have occurred had Vehicle #1 been going 
55 or 65; is that correct? 
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"A (No answer). 
"Q You have to have a bunch of other factors involved 
besides the simple matter of speed; correct? 
"A Yes, you have to have a point of perception." 
On recross by Mr. Jeffs, Trooper Bailey states at 
pages 93 and 94 of the record as follows: 
"Q But, aside from that, you still would have, if 
he'd been going 55, he would have been further down 
the road when Vehicle #2 crossed the highway? 
"A Well, I don't know if I can answer that. All 
I can do is go from the point of perception to the 
point of impact. I don't know what his speed was 
prior to the point of perception. I don't know, you 
know, he might have been going 100 down the road or 
he might have been doing 20. I don't know." 
"Q But let's assume the same thing that Counsel 
asked you when he asked you to assume that that was 
a constant 18 miles per hour that Vehicle #2 was 
cross.ing the highway. Let's assume a constant 55 
miles per hour as he comes from Gunnison. He would 
have been further down the road when Vehicle #2 
crossed that highway? 
"A That's correct. 
"Q And there wouldn't have been any accident? 
"A Probably not." 
On redirect Trooper Bailey was asked by Mr. Madsen 
at page 94 of the transcript: 
"Q And that's why we'd asked if he had been going 
80, he would have been way beyond any possible inter-
section in this same vein, and that's what you can't 
possibly state; correct? 
"A That's correct." 
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LOOKOUT: The testimony with respect to the issue 
of lookout on the part of plaintiff Lynn came largely f rorn him. 
However, some testimony of the defendant is pertinent to this 
issue, although defendant Dorius testified that he at no time 
saw the plaintiff's vehicle. The testimony of Mro Lynn has.been 
quoted only in part by the defendant, and in so quoting it, that 
testimony has been seriously distorted. Mr. Lynn's testimony 
with regard to the matter starts on page 279 of the record and 
we will quote all relevant portions of that testimony. 
At pages 279-81 of the transcript, questions are being 
put by Mr. Madsen, counsel for plaintiffs, and the answers are 
those of Mr. Lynn: 
"Q What happened next? 
"A As we proceeded down the road, I glanced over and 
saw a pickup truck corning up towards the road. This 
is Fayette and he was coming across from Fayette to 
the cemetery. 
"Q How long or what distance down the road did you 
keep that vehicle under observation? 
"A I glanced at it and saw it coming and paid no more 
attention to and then, all of a sudden, I realized he 
wasn't going to stop. 
"Q When was it and where was he when you realized that 
he wasn't going to stop? 
"A Within a hundred or a hundred and twenty feet or 
so, I!m not sure. 
"Q Of the road itself? 
"A Of the cross road, right. 
"Q Did you keep him under observation from that point? 
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"A From that point on, I yelled at Dick and I said, 
'That knuckle head isn't going to stop, and I'm going 
to have to' -- and I slammed on my brakes and they 
skidded. 
"Q At the same time you were saying this to Dick, 
you're slamming on your brakes? 
"A Absolutely. 
"Q About how fast do you estimate the pickup truck 
was going? 
"A Oh, not over 20 or 25. I mean I'm no authority 
on speed when a car is going sideways but he wasn't 
speeding; that's for sure. 
"Q Were you able to determine whether he was slowing 
down for the stop sign? 
"A I didn't see any effort at all to slow down. 
"Q Was there a stop sign there? 
"A Oh, yes. 
"Q Controlling access to the highway? 
"A Right. 
"Q And you did not see him stop at that stop sign? 
"A No .. 
"Q Did you see him stop at any point during that 
100 foot distance? 
"A I didn't. As I observed him, I didn't see any 
·stop whatsoever. Although, again, let me say I 
didn't exactly keep my eye on him all the time. I 
saw him and then the next time I saw him, I realized 
he wasn't going to stop. 
"Q Was there anything obstructing your view of him 
at any point along the way? 
"A No way. I could see him all the time." 
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On cross-examination by Mr. ~eff:s~ plaintiff Lynn 
testified at pages 306-307 of the transcript as follows: 
"Q And how far back was he from that stop sign 
when you first saw him? 
"A 1his is conjecture. I can't tell you for sure, 
but it was back maybe a half block or a fourth of a 
block or a half a block. 
"Q And do you have any estimate how far you were 
from where the collision took place at that time? 
"A Not really. I had no reason to try to record 
the particular position in my mind. 
"Q Well, I recognize that. I'm just trying to 
determine whether you do have any recollection of 
that. You have no estimate of how far back you were? 
"A Not really. 
"Q At the time you did become aware that there was 
a circumstance of grave concern you have indicated, 
I believe on direct examination that he was back 
about 100 feet from the stop sign; is that what you 
have testified to? 
"A I didn't know for sure. I didn't say that, I 
don't believe. 
"Q That's what I thought your direct testimony was 
that you estimated for Mr. Madsen that he was back 
maybe 100 feet before the stop sign. 
"A 100 - 75 feet - 125 feet -- this is something 
which is strictly an estimation and has to be. 
"Q From the time when you first saw the Darius 
pickup truck until the time of the impact, did you 
ever become aware of that pickup truck stopping? 
"A Absolutely not. 
"Q Was there a time frame sufficient that it could 
have stopped and then re-proceeded without your being 
aware of it? 
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"A Very unlikely. 
"Q When you first saw the Darius pickup truck 
coming from the west, had you already come up out 
of the dip in the road that lies to the south there? 
"A Those dips of yours are so small that you're 
not even aware they're there or you're in them when 
you're in a car. 
"Q Not aware of any obstruction of your visibility? 
"A There-wasn't any." 
Further, with Mr. Jeffs continuing on cross-examination, 
plaintiff Lynn testified at page 311 of the transcript: 
"Q What is your best estimate ~s to the distance from 
the stop sign of the Darius vehicle when you first became 
aware that he was not going to stop at that stop sign? 
"A As I recall he was probably passing the stop sign 
itself. 
"Q You didn't become aware until he was actually 
passing it? 
"A Until he actually wasn't stopping, yes. 
"Q You didn't see him in the last hundred feet before 
that stop sign? 
"A Not -- you probably see someone but you're not 
really looking at him; you're not conscious of it, 
you're looking at the road. 
"Q Didn't you testify that he didn't make any effort 
to slow down for the stop sign? 
"A In my estimation he didn't. 
"Q Is that a conclusion you have drawn by after 
the fact or is that from observation? 
"A That's from an observation and from what he said 
himself. I'm quoting him there. 
"Q Well, I'm asking you what you saw. 
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"A Okeh. I didn't see him slow down and I didn't 
see him stop. I saw him move through the stop sign 
at a fairly ~cod rate of speed. 
"Q And at what distance before the stop sign did 
you see him proceeding to and through that stop sign? 
"A That's hard to say. I mean I really, really 
wasn't looking over his way particularly but I could 
see when I saw him and realized he was coming through, 
he was already had his nose coming up toward the stop 
sign. 
"Q You didn't pay any particularly attention to him 
in that hundred feet before that? 
"A No. You really kind of trust people thinking 
they're going to stop when it says to. 
"Q Was there anything between your line of sight and 
the Darius vehicle at any time from the time you first 
saw him that would have obstructed your vision of him? 
"A I really don't think so. As I've looked at it 
since, I could see nothing. I've been by since, you 
know, and I've looked at it and I could see nothing 
that could prevent him from seeing anything coming 
down the road. 
"Q Was there anything that obstructed your seeing 
him? 
"A Well, that's the same question over again. Of 
course not." 
On redirect by Mr. Madsen, plaintiff Lynn testified 
on page 321 of the transcript: 
"Q Calling your attention to your observations of the 
pickup truck, had the pickup truck stopped and had its 
driver gotten out to pick something up, would you have 
seen that? Were you that aware of the truck at this 
time? 
"A I was down the road about a mile and a half. I 
couldn't have seen it. 
"Q Did it so stop and did the driver get out at any 
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time under your observation? 
"A Absolutely not." 
Plaintiff Lynn testified that after the collision he 
had a conversation with defendant Darius, at which time Dorius 
stated to him: 
"Gee, I'm sorry. I didn't see you. I didn't 
stop; it was all my fault." (Tr:284). 
In his own testimony Darius confirmed that that state-
ment was accurate (Tr:332). 
Mr. Darius testified that he was proceeding east on 
the dirt road approaching Highway SR28, that he stopped on the 
highway, left his vehicle running and got out and removed a limb 
from the highway (Tr:326). He stated that it took him "probably 
ten seconds" to bring "the vehicle to a stop, get out and move 
the limb and get back into the vehicle." (Tr:329). He stated 
that he stopped for the limb at a distance of at least 100 feet 
west of an electrical substation situated beside the dirt road 
and that·the substation was s'Omewhere between 40 and 100 feet 
west of the stop sign, so that ·the limb was between 140 and 200 
feet west of the stop sign (not 40 or 50 feet as stated at page 3 
of appellant's brief) (Tr:353). 
Defendant was asked by his counsel on direct examination, 
"Did you consider the stopping to get the limb the 
equivalent of stopping for the stop sign?" 
to which Mr. Darius stated: 
"Yes, I did." (Tr: 354-6) 
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He further stated on direct examination by Mr. Jeffs 
(Tr:340-341): 
"Q (By Mr. Jeffs) Your answer is: There was never 
a time that a vehicle could be completely obscured from 
coming from the south? 
"A Not where I was stopped. There was no reason why 
I couldn't have seen something. 
"Q Okeh. Do you have any explanation for why, as 
you got back in your vehicle, that you did not see the 
Lynn vehicle coming from the south? 
"A Well, I think something must have obscured my view 
in the truck, either the post on the door, the mirror 
on the side of the truck, as I was going on, something. 
We must have been going in the same area, so that when 
I looked out there, he must have been there but the 
mirror or the post must have covered it. The circum-
stances were that he was there but I couldn't see him 
because of some object that was in the truck itself. 
"Q Now, what are you talking about when you say the 
post? 
"A The door post, where the window is, it's part of 
a door or part of the window or possibly it was the 
rear view mirror or something. 
"Q The rear view mirror that's on the right hand side? 
"A Yes." 
On cross-examination by Mr. Madsen, the transcript 
discloses the following testimony by defendant at page 356: 
"Q Now, let me be sure I have it in sequence. You 
looked to the south at the time you got back in the 
car and started across SR-28? 
"A Right .. 
"Q And did not look at the south again until impact? 
"A I didn't ever look again evidently. 
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"Q Did you look to the north at the time you got 
back into the truck after removing the limb? 
"A Yes, certainly. 
"Q Did you look to the north again after that first 
view until the accident? 
"A I really can't remember what I did. 
"Q When you indicated my client, as you referred to 
him, told the truth when he indicated in a conversation 
specifically. Do you remember telling him you did not 
stop for the stop sign? 
"A I knew I felt bad for having run out in front of 
them. 
"Q Answer the question. 
"A I feel like what they said is as close as I can 
recall what was said. 
"Q Specifically, do you recall telling them you did 
not stop for the stop sign? 
"A I remember the conversation with the officer but 
I don' t remember saying that particular thing. 
"Q Do you remember telling them that you were at fault? 
"A I think they told the truth when they said that. 
"Q I'm asking you what you remember that you said? 
"A I had received a pretty bad bump on the head. I'm 
sure I was just going on because they both had their, 
you know --
"Q Are you trying to suggest that you don't really 
clearly remember what was it he said in that conversation? 
"A I know the gist of what he said at this time but 
being a year later, I would agree with them that is what 
was said. 
"Q They have testified you told them that you didn't 
see the stop sign and didn't stop for it and you were 
sorry and that it was your fault. 
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"A Well, I haven't heard a dishonest thing from 
then yet and I would go on just that." 
After both sides had rested, the plaintiffs made a 
motion for a directed V.erdict on the issue of liability_ of the 
grounds that there was no evidence that any purported negligence 
on the part of plaintiff Lynn was a proximate cause of the col-
lision in question. That matter was argued to the Court, and 
the Court granted the motion and stated that he felt there was 
no evidence of negligence. The Court stated (Tr:391}: 
"The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that 
the defendant is negligent and that the plaintiffs 
are not negligent, and the Court grants a directed --
will direct the jury to just determine the iss~e of 
damages." 
The Court further added: 
"For the purpose of the record, the Court finds 
further that likewise there is no proximate cause, 
but I don't find that there is any negligence and 
so I don't think it makes any difference." 
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TIMELINESS OF APPEAL: The facts relating to the time-
liness of defendant's appeal are as follows: 
After entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment, the defendant filed a Motion for New Trial. Briefs 
were filed by the parties relating thereto, and the matter was 
argued orally before Judge Tibbs in Manti. Judge Tibbs denied 
the Motion for New Trial and Order Denying Motion for New Trial 
was entered in the Register of Actions on November 13, 1981. 
(R:95,179) (See also Affidavit of Wanda Bartholomew, Deputy County 
Clerk of Sanpete County, filed in the Supreme Court in connection 
with Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction.) 
Thus the time for appeal began to run on November 13, 
1981, and would have been up on December 13, 1981 (one month 
later), but the 13th was a Sunday, so that the last day of the 
one-month appeal time was December 14, 1982. Defendant actually 
fil-ed his Notice of Appeal in the District Court of Sanpete 
County on December 16, 1981, two days late (R:97,181). 
On or about December 31, 1981, respondents made a 
motion in this Court to dismiss the appeal of the defendant for 
lack of jurisdiction. That motion was heard by this Court on 
January 18, 1982. At that time the Court denied the Motion to 
Dismiss the Appeal, but denied the same "without prejudice to 
raise as an issue on appeal." 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION. 
SPEED. Defendant attempts to establish negligent spee1 
on the part of the plaintiffs by reference to Sec.· 41-6-46 (2) (c) 
In Cardon v. Brenchley, 575 P2d 184 (Utah 1978), this Court dis-
cussed the matter of prima facie evidence of negligent speed. 
The Court there stated: 
"The overriqing principal governing negligence 
is the exercise of the degree of care which an ordinary, 
reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances. 
In order for the plaintiff to recover, she must show that 
the defendant was negligent in failing to exercise that 
degree of care; and also that his negligence was the proximate 
cause of the collision." 
Defendant has the burden of proof to establish that plaintiffs' 
speed was negligent and that such speed, if negligent, was a 
proximate cause of the collision. Defendant fails on both counts 
There is no showing in this case that plaintiffs' speed~either 
55 or 65 or anything in between~amounted to negligence under the 
circumstances of this case, but furthermore there is no showing 
whatsoever that the plaintiffs' speed was a proximate cause of 
the collision. 
In his brief defendant mentions the word "causation" 
once on page 6 of the brief, but nowhere refers to any evidence 
whatever from which it could be concluded that speed in any way 
caused the collision. There simply is no such evidence. 
The thrust of defendant's speed argument is found in 
his brief (page 8), where he asserts that "speed was a factor in 
the accident." He there quotes from Trooper Bailey ((Tr:94) (in 
response to a question by Mr. Jeffs: 
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"Let's assume a constant 55 mile per hour as he 
comes from Gunnison. He would have been further down 
the road when Vehicle #2 crossed that highway." 
To which Trooper Bailey answered: 
"That's correct." 
But, if we assume a constant speed of 75 or 85 miles 
per hour, we would have to acknowledge that plaintiff would have 
been way past the point of impact at the time in question. It 
is obvious that such reasoning is specious and totally irrelevant. 
Trooper Bailey's own testimony was that his calculations shed no 
light upon the speed of the Lynn vehicle prior to point of per-
ception. There is therefore no testimony whatsoever from any 
source that plaintiff Lynn was exceeding 55 miles per hour prior 
to the point of perception, which was his speed by his own 
testimony. 
There are numerous cases in which the aforesaid "speed" 
argument of defendant has been rejected. 
We refer the Court to the case of Larson v. Evans, 
364 P2d 1088 (1961) 
12 Ut 2d 245/. That case involved a fact situation similar to the 
instant case. In that case the trial court had submitted to the 
jury the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence and denied 
a motion for a new trial on the part of the plaintiff on the 
grounds that the jury could not reasonably find that plaintiff's 
speed was a proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court 
of Utah noted that there was evidence submitted which would sup-
port a finding that the speed of the Larson vehicle was in 
excess of 30 miles per hour and noted that evidence of plain-
tiff's speed was irrelevant to the question of his negligence 
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in the absence of a showing that such speed violated some duty 
which he might have had under the circumstances. The court 
noted at page 239: 
"Not only did the defendant fail to show that John 
Larson was negligent in the speed at wh~ch he was · 
traveling, but he failed also to show any causal con-
nection between plaintiff's speed and the accident." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The same can be said of the facts of this case as the 
defendant has toally failed to show any causal connection between 
plaintiff's speed and the collision which occurred in this action 
In the case of Smith v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 681 
• (U.S. Dist. Court, W.D. No. Carolina, Charlotte Div., 1951) the 
facts involve a situation where the plaintiff ran a stop sign 
and proceeded from a secondary road onto a favored highway, there 
colliding with a vehicle being driven on the main highway by the 
defendant. Plaintiff contended that the defendant was speeding. 
The court stated that even if it were to be assumed that the 
defendant had been speeding, still such speeding was not a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. The court stated: 
"If one would assume that the automobile of the 
defendant was being operated too rapidly or in violation 
of the speed regulations of North Carolina in force and 
effect as of the date of the collision, still it could 
hardly be said that the rate of speed would have been 
the proximate cause of the alleged injury of the plain-
tiff or the damage to his property. Undoubtedly, the 
cause of plaintiff's injury is predicated upon his 
driving out from a secondary roadway into the highway 
into the face of oncoming traffic." 
In Kane v. Williams, 181 A.2d 651 (Maryland 1962),the 
court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the granting of a motion for 
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directed verdict. In that case the appellant, an 11-year-old, 
was riding a bicycle and ran a stop sign and proceeded out into 
the highway. The appell~nt claimed that the motorist who col-
lided with the 11-year-old was driving at an excessive rate of 
speed. The court held as a matter of law that the negligence of 
the cyclist was the proximate cause of the accident. The court 
stated: 
"On the theory that the defendant was traveling 
too fast in a school zone on a school day and at a time 
when children were going to school a·nd should therefore 
have foreseen what happended, the infant plaintiff 
further suggests that he should not be charged with 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, but his 
argument is not sound under the circumstances. For 
here, where the defendant had the right of way, and the 
movements of the inf ant plaintiff were the proximate 
cause of the accident, it would be mere conjecture to 
say that the cyclist might not have been struck if the 
motorist had been driving slower and had exercised more 
foresight." 
In Chiasson v. Connecticut, 144 So.2d 726 (Louisiana 
1962), the fact situation was presented in which the driver of 
a car approaching a through highway stopped at a stop sign and 
then proceeded cautiously into the intersection. The trial court 
had held that both that driver and the driver of the vehicle on 
the main highway were guilty of negligence. There was some 
testimony in that action that the driver of the vehicle on the 
main highway was exceeding the speed limit. The appellate court 
held that the evidence of such alleged excessive speed was not 
sufficient, but stated further: 
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"Moreover if the station wagon was traveling at 
approximately 5 miles per hour as the trial judge found 
and if in fact the accident occcurred while Orgeron was 
going 40 miles per hour it still would have occurred 
had he been going only 30 miles per hour. It follows 
that his speed was not a proximate cause of the 
accident 
"We might indulge in all sorts of mathematical cal-
culations in an endeavor to determine whether Orgeron 
could have stopped in time to avoid the accident after 
he saw·or should have seen the station wagon, and all 
of the calculations would ultimately be based on the 
estimates of speed and distance testified to by Mrs. 
Chiasson and Orgeron. In our opinion the proof is 
insufficient to show that Orgeron could have avoided 
the accident." 
We believe in the instant case there is likewise 
insufficient evidence to show that any difference in speed would 
have had a different result in this case. 
It should further be noted that there is a serious 
danger in attempting to determine with mathematical precision 
stopping distance, reaction times and the like based upon esti-
mates only. As was noted in the case of Mulbach v. Hertig, 
15 Ut 2d 121, 388 P2d 414 (1964): 
"Defendant's counsel has proceeded from estimates 
as to speeds and distance to precise refinements down 
to fractions of seconds of time and feet and inches 
of distance to demonstrate that at the time defendant 
was at the stop sign the plaintiff must have been at 
sufficient distance away that he could have stopped 
or so controlled his truck as to avoid the collision. 
No useful purpose would be served by setting forth and 
analyzing these niceties. It may well be that had 
plaintiff kept a constant watch directly upon the 
defendant and nothing else, he might in some manner 
have avoided this accident. But in the exercise of 
due care he could not very well do so, but was 
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obliged to be alert to other possible dangers on the 
highway and particularly at the intersection." 
We believe the same argument can be made in the instant 
Finally, we cite to the Court the case of Davis v. 
Brooks, 186 F.Supp. 366 (U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Delaware, _1960). 
In that case the plaintiff's decedent ran a stop sign and pro-
ceeded out into the highway at an excessive rate of speed, there 
colliding with a truck driven by the defendant. There was evi-
dence that the truck had been exceeding the speed limit slightly. 
The court held at page 368: 
"The first question for decision is whether Massie 
was guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause 
of the accident. If not, that is an end to the matter. 
He was going slightly, very slightly, in excess of the 
legal limit. This was negligence per se. But was this 
excess speed of two miles per hour over the statute a 
proximate cause of the accident? The point of inquiry 
is whether this accident would have ever happened at 
all but for the incredibly reckless operation of the 
plaintiff's machine, bearing in mind that even had the 
defendant's truck been stopped, the accident would have 
still happened. Thus viewed, it is apparent that the 
sole cause of the accident was the reckless negligence 
of the plaintiff Davis." (Emphasis added.) 
It was established without question that the defendant's 
truck was moving at approximately 47 miles per hour, and it is 
thus clear that where the court states that the accident would 
have happened anyway, the court is assuming that the defendanthad 
to be deemed to be at the point of impact in that case in any 
event. The court has thus concluded that it is irrelevant to 
talk in terms of the speed of the truck as being slower or faster 
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than the speed limit in terms of proximity to the accident, 
obviously for the same reasons as we have heretofore pointed 
out~that a difference in speed ~ould have placed the defendant 
at a different location entirely from that at which this coliisic 
occurred. Thus a difference in the defendant's speed might ina 
philosophical sense be considered to be a cause of the accident 
inasmuch as a driver's speed, whatever it is, is the speed neces-
sary to bring him to the point of impact. But the point is that 
speed is not a proximate cause of the accident just because it 
is the speed that brings the motorist to the point of impact. 
In order for the speed to become a proximate cause, it must be 
shown by the weight of the evidence that the speed under the 
facts of a given case somehow contributed to the accident in 
some way other than simply showing that that was the necessary 
speed to bring the motorist to the point of impact. 
There .is no evidence whatsoever in this action that 
the plaintiff's speed in any way contributed to the collision in 
question. The Court was entirely justified in so holding as a 
matter of law, and indeed, we believe, was required to do so 
under the facts of this case. 
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LOOKOUT: With respect to the matter of lookout, 
plaintiff Lynn testified that he first saw defendant's vehicle 
when it was one-fourth to one-half a block west of the highway 
(Tr:306). As noted in Mulbach v. Hertig, supra, plaintiff was 
not required to keep a "constant watch directly upon the defend-
ant and nothing else" thereafter. As noted in that case, in the 
exercise of due care he could not do that, but was obliged to be 
alert to other possible dangers on the highway and particularly 
at the intersection. We believe that the testimony with regard 
to the lookout maintained by plaintiff Lynn more than meets that 
standard. The testimony of Mr. Lynn discloses: 
1. Lynn observed the defendant's vehicle when it was 
between 75 and 125 feet from the stop sign (Tr:306) · 
It should be noted that the stop sign was approximately 59 feet 
from the point of impact, which indicates that p1aintiff L.ynn 
clearly saw the vehicle west of the stop sign. 
2. Plaintiff Lynn observed that the defendant did 
not stop at the stop'sign (Tr:279-281), and plaintiff 
Lyrintestified that he first became aware that Darius was not 
going to stop at the stop sign when Deritis was "probably passing 
the stop sign itself.'~ (Tr:311) He further testified that he 
saw that. the defendant did not slow down, saw that he did not 
stop and saw that he moved through the stop sign at a "fairly 
(Tr: 311) 
good rate of speed. 11 / At another place in his testimony, he puts 
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the speed at approximately 20 miles per hour (Tr:280). 
3. Plaintiff Lynn testified that he did not see the 
defendant stop his truck and get out of it and remove the limb 
from the road, or any such action (Tr: 3 21) . 
4o He testified that when he realized that defendant 
was not going to stop, the defendant "already had his nose coming 
up toward the stop sign." (Tr:311). 
5. Plaintiff Lynn testified that, after observing 
that defendant was not going to stop for the stop sign, he "yelled 
at" his companion in the car: "That knuckle head isn't going to 
stop" and "slammed on his brakes."(Tr:280) 
It is thus clear that plaintiff Lynn kept the defendant 
under frequent and repeated observation from the time he first 
noticed him. This observation was not constant, but it was 
reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. In view of the 
defendant's rather moderate speed, there was nothing that the 
defendant did until he actually didn't stop that would have 
alerted plaintiff to any danger. It is possible that had the 
defendant been speeding, that the plaintiff might have been on 
notice earlier that the defendant was not going to stop and/or 
could not stop. However, at a speed of 20 miles an hour (and 
Trooper Bailey places the speed at 18 miles per hour at impact) 
there was no circumstance to alert the plaintiff to danger until 
plaintiff reached the stop sign and failed to stop for the same. 
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The testimony is undisputed that plaintiff was watching the 
defendant at that point and thereafter. 
Defendant would have us believe that plaintiff Lynn 
was required to assume that defendant would not observe the stop 
sign. Utah law is directly to the contrary. Plaintiff had a 
right to assume that defendant would observe the law until such 
time as a contrary result was evident. 
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It is thus clear that plaintiff Lynn is only required 
to be aware of the danger at that point when it was clear that 
defendant was not going to stop, but rather was going to proceed 
out on to the highway in a collision course with plaintiff. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in this action that 
Lynn did not keep a reasonable and proper lookout, and to have 
submitted the matter to the jury on that issue would have been 
clearly error. 
At the trial, and also in his brief, defendant spends 
considerable time discussing the matter of the limb on the road. 
We believe that discussion to be nothing more thana"red herring" 
and to be totally irrelevant. Even if defendant did stop 140 to 
200 feet west of the stop sign, it would not constitute a stop 
for the stop sign under any view of this case. The fact that 
defendant deemed it to be a stop at the stop sign shows only 
total lack of judgment. Further, it appears that the defendant 
is attempting to infer that since the plaintiff did not see the 
defendant stop, the plaintiff was somehow not keeping a proper 
lookout. By defendant's own testimony, it took him ten seconds 
to stop, get out of the truck, remove the limb and get back into 
the truck. He then had a minimum of 140 feet to travel to the 
stop sign. At 18 miles per hour (26 feet per second), it would 
take him another 5.4 seconds minimum to get to the stop sign. 
F'urthermore, since he would be accelerating from a stop, it 
would no doubt take a second or two longer than that. 
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Thus, it is clear that a minimum of approximately 18 
seconds elapsed between the so-called stopping of the vehicle 
for the limb and defendant's reaching the stop sign. If plain-
tiff was traveling 55 miles an hour, then working backwards 18 
seconds from point of impact would place the plaintiff at least 
1,440 feet south of the point of impact (18 seconds times 80 
feet per second). At 65 miles per hour times 18 seconds, the 
plaintiff would be down the highway 1,720 feet (95 feet per 
second times 18 seconds). 
It appears unlikely that· the defendant could stop his 
truck, get out of it, remove a limb and get back into it in the 
10 seconds he indicates. It would appear likely that it would 
take considerably longer than that, probably a minimum of 20 to 
30 seconds. If that is so, it would place the plaintiff Lynn 
even further down the highway. 
Thus, it is evident that it would not be unusual for 
a driver not to particularly take notice of someone stopping on 
a dirt road in excess of 1,440 feet (or 1,710 or more feet) down 
the highway. Whether a driver would notice such conduct at that 
distance is pure speculation, and in any event would not be negli-
gence nor indicate any lack of attention. For the Court to have 
submitted that matter to the jury would simply have permitted 
the jury to speculate on a totally irrelevant matter. 
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Defendant cites a number of cases in his brief 
standing for the proposition that the driver who has the right-
of-way cannot, because of his favored status, totally ignore 
everything else that is happening on the road in front of him. 
Those cases are collected generally in defendant's brief on 
pages 11 to 21. We do not quarrel with the aforesaid propo-
sition. However, those cases are inapplicable in this case 
because the uncontroverted evidence is that the plaintiff Lynn 
kept a reasonable lookout at all times. Furthermore, canvassing 
those cases cited by the defendant reveals that each one is fac-
• 
tually very different from the instant case. 
Country Club Foods v. Barney, 10 Ut 2d 317, 352 P2d 
776 (1960) , involved a case where the favored driver initially 
saw the other vehicle when it was a considerable distance away, 
and didn't see it again "until a split second before the impact." 
The trial judge sitting as a factfinder in that case found that 
there might be some negligence inherent in that circumstance, 
but held that any such negligence was not a proximate cause of 
the collision. 
In the instant case plaintiff Lynn was aware of defend-
ant when he was one-fourth to one-half a block away and almost 
continually from the time he was 75 to 100 feet away. He testi-
fied that he was only alerted to the fact that defendant was not 
going to stop at the stop sign until he in fact did not stop for it. 
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As soon as he was aware that defendant intended to violate the 
law, he applied his brakes. There can be no negligence nor 
causation in those facts. 
In Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co. et al., 106 Ut 289, 
147 P2d 875 (1944), the favored driver had entered the inter-
section before he ever saw the other driver, who was then 50 
feet away going 40 miles per hour. The favored driver testified 
that he assumed the other would stop, but he did not look again 
until "just at the moment of impact. 11 There was no stop sign 
involved and that case presents a totally different fact pic-
ture than the instant case. 
In Gren v. Norton, 117 Ut 121, 213 P2d 356 (Utah 1949), 
the favored driver proceeded past a stop sign at a time when the 
other driver was 250 feet north of the intersection. The favored 
driver never again looked until "about 10 feet east of the point 
of collision." 
In Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Ut 1, 190 P2d 514 (1948), the 
court states in effect that once a driver notices another car 
which is a potential hazard, the first driver cannot ignore the 
other vehicle completely thereafter. In that case the favored 
driver stopped at the stop sign, observed the other car a con-
siderable distance from the intersection and the favored driver 
proceeded through the intersection, but never again looked at 
the other vehicle. 
In Johnson v. Syme, 6 Ut 2d 319, 313 P2d 468 (1957), 
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the favored driver never saw the other vehicle at all, even 
though the other vehicle had lights burning. 
In Thurman v. Partridge, 8 Ut 2d 9, 326 P2d 1024 (1958) 
the street was covered with six inches of .snow. The Court held 
that it could not say as a matter of law that the favored driver 
was not negligent. This was apparently based upon the speed of 
the favored driver in the light of the fact that there was six 
inches of snow on the ground and that neither driver was able to 
control his vehicle at the speeds at which they were going. 
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Ut 2d 17, 337 P2d 59 (1959) 
the favored driver never saw the other vehicle "until he was a 
few feet" from him. The Court concluded in that case that the 
favored driver had ample opportunity to observe and avoid the 
other vehicle. 
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P2d 339 (Utah 1979) involved 
an auto-pedestrian collision on Sunnyside Avenue. In that case 
the favored pedestrian was crossing the street, and there was 
testimony the pedestrian "didn't seem to be aware that a car was 
bearing down on him", which presented a case where there was evi-
dence from which negligence of the favored pedestrian could be 
determined. 
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P2d 530 (Utah 1979) presented a 
case where the evidence disclosed that neither the driver nor 
the pedestrian saw the other. The pedestrian had dark clothing 
and it was a dark, cloudy day. That case obviously presented a 
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situation which was proper for jury determination on comparative 
negligence. 
In Little America Refining v. Leyba et al., 641P2d112 
(Utah 1982) the trial court directed a verdict of no liability as 
to defendant Heimberg apparently on the basis that the evidence 
disclosed that the Leyba vehicle had hit or pushed the Heimberg 
vehicle into plaintiff's gas pumps and that Heimberg was thus an 
innocent third party. The Supreme Court however held that there 
was evidence from which a factual determination could be madethat 
Leyba and Heimberg had been racing down Victory Road, and that 
that circumstance, if true, could constitute a proximate cause. 
Conklin v. Walsch, 113 Ut 276, 193 P2d 437 (1948) 
involved a case in which a full stop was made before entering 
the highway. Furthermore, the favored driver, although he noted 
the other driver on one occasion, never thereafter observed the 
other driver at any time. 
In Badger v. Clayson, 18 Ut 2d 329, 422 P2d 665 (1967) 
there was a collision at a "blind intersection" for the two vehicles 
in question. It was a matter of a changing right-of-way situa-
tion affected by the traffic light and the language quoted by 
appellant that under such traffic device, changing conditions 
must be observed, is good law, but not applicable here since we 
are dealing with a permanent traffic regulator in the form of a 
stop sign, not a changing one. Moreover, the party in that case 
who had the right-of-way admitted he did not look to the left to 
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see whether the defendant was or was not coming because of the 
obstructed corner. The case is helpful in that it makes clear 
that the favored driver can rely on the other driver observing 
the law until he "sees, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have seen, that the other vehicle is going to proceed 
against the s.ignal. " 
Martin v. Stevens, 121 Ut 484, 243 P2d 747 (1952) is 
another "blind intersection" accident where there was no traffic 
control device, and again we agree with so much of the case as 
quoted by appellant as being good law in that fact situation, 
but not helpful here. 
In the case of Yoshitaro Okuda v. Rose, 5 Ut 2d 39, 
296 P2d 287 (1956) there was a pedestrian-automobile accident at 
night involving circumstantial evidence which of course required 
a factfinder, and the case is not helpful in the instant fact 
situation. 
Appellant cites Kim v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1270 (1980) 
wherein this court states: 
"The trial court is to examine the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party against whQm a directed 
verdict motion is made." 
We do not quarrel with that law, but point out merely 
that this action was a medical malpractice case where a dentist 
dropped a drill bit down the throat of his patient. Presenting 
the issue of whether or not there had been adequate evidence from 
medical experts on the standard of care in the profession is 
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not helpful in the instant fact situation. 
In Bates v. Burns, 3 Ut 2d 180, 281 P2d 209 (1955), 
although it appears that the favored driver was essentially 
without fault, he did not see the other driver until the 
favored driver was well into the intersection, thus presenting 
a jury question on his contributory negligence. 
It is thus evident that the cases relied upon by 
defendant generally involved belated observation by the favored 
driver or cases where the favored driver observed the other 
driver at some considerable distance from the point of impact 
and thereafter totally disregarded the existence of the other 
driver. This is not at all the fact situation involved in 
the instant case. 
At page 16 of his brief defendant refers to Section 
41-6-71, Utah Code Annotated, and attempts to rely on the pro-
visions thereof. The problem is that that section gives the 
driver stopping at a stop sign no rights until he has stopped. 
At that time he can proceed provided there are no other vehicles 
consituting an immediate hazard. In the instant case the testi-
mony is uncontroverted that the defendant never stopped at the 
stop sign. He stopped some 140 feet prior to the stop sign, but 
that cannot be construed as a stop under any circumstances. 
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At page 4 of defendant's brief he asserts: 
"The defendant-appellant was proceeding from his 
stopped position across the arterial highway and at 
the time of impact had reached 18 miles per hour." 
There is no basis in the facts for that assertion 
whatsoever. The so-called "stopped position" was 140 feet from 
the stop sign and is no more starting out across the highway 
from a stopped position than could be claimed for Mr. Darius 
starting out from his home from a stopped position and then 
proceeding across the arterial highway later in the day. It 
is a statement absolutely without basis in fact. 
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POINT II. DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT 
TIMELY. 
Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered in the 
Register of Actions on November 13, 1981. Notice of Appeal 
should have been filed within one month thereof, to-wit, on 
December 13, 1981. Since December 13 was a Sunday, the filing 
deadline was extended to December 14, 1981. The Notice of 
Appeal was not filed until December 16 (two days late) and 
therefore the appeal was not timely and should be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
The time for filing notice of appeal to the Supreme 
Court is governed by Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
relevant portions of that rule are as follows: 
(a) "When an appeal is permitted from a district 
court to the Supreme Court, the time within which an 
appeal may be taken shall be one month from the date 
of the entry in the Register of Actions of the judgment 
or order appealed from unless a shorter time is pro-
vided by law . . . 
"The running of the time for appeal is terminated 
by a timely motion pursuant to any of the rules herein-
after enumerated, and the full time for appeal fixed 
in this subdivision commences to run and is to be com-
puted from the date of the entry in the Register of 
Actions of any of the following orders made upon a 
timely motion under such rules: ... denying a motion 
for a new trial under Rule 59. 
"A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with 
the district court a notice of appeal, together with 
sufficient copies thereof for mailing to the Supreme 
Court and all other parties to the judgment, and 
depositing therewith the fee required for docketing 
the appeal in the Supreme Court. The clerk of the 
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district court shall forthwith transmit one copy of 
the notice of appeal, showing the date of filing, 
together with the required fee, to the Supreme Court 
where the appeal shall be duly docketed. Failure of 
the appellant to take any of the further steps to 
secure the review of the judgment appealed from does 
not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground 
only for such remedies as are specified in this rule 
or, when no remedy is specified, for such action as 
the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal. (Emphasis added.) 
(b) ~The notice ~f appeal shall specify the parties 
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or 
part thereof appealed from; and shall designate that 
the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court. Notification 
of the filing of the notice of appeal shall be given by 
appellant serving a copy [copies] thereof on all the 
parties to the judgment. The notification to a party 
shall be given by serving a copy of the notice of 
appeal on his attorney of record or, if the party is 
not represented by an attorney, then on the party at 
his last known address, and such notification is suf-
ficient notwithstanding the death of the party or his 
attorney prior to the giving of the notification." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that Rule 73 provides that the appeal 
must be taken within one month fron entry in the Register of 
Actions and the notice of appeal must be filed, not merely 
mailed within that period of time. Although it states half 
way through the third paragraph of Rule 73 (a) that f·ailure to take 
"further steps" is not jurisdictional, this clearly indicates 
that the matters which precede that declaration in the said 
section, to-wit, the "one month" requirement and the "filing" 
requirement are both jurisdictional. 
There is a provision in subparagraph (b) of Rule 73 
relating to appellant's mailing copies of notice of appeal. 
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Since the mailing requirement appears after the clause 
describing nonjurisdictional matters, the mailing itself 
would appear to be nonjurisdictional, but this only emphasizes 
the fact that the filing within one month is jurisdictional. 
In sununary, the filing within one month appears to be 
clearly jurisdictional, whereas the mailing of copies is not 
considered such. Rule 73 has not been amended in the particulars 
noted since its original adoption (although it has been amended 
with relation to other matters). 
Utah case law, without exception, has interpreted the 
one month filing requirement as jurisdictional. 
In Anderson v. Anderson; 3 Ut 2d 277, 282 P2d 845, 
the order appealed from was entered on February 23, 1954. On 
March 23, 1954, defendant served upon counsel for plaintiffs a 
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court, but did not present it to 
the clerk for filing until March 24. At page 279 of the opinion 
our Supreme Court refers to Rule 73(a), URCP, and sets forth in 
italics the phrase which we have referred to above, "by filing 
with the district court." The Court then states the following 
at page 280, clearly showing failure to file is jurisdictional: 
"The purpose of this Rule to make jurisdictional 
a failure to file the notice of appeal on time is clearly 
evident by the special provision therein that: 
"'Failure of the appellant to take any of the fur-
ther steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed 
from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is 
ground only for such remedies as are specified in this 
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rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such action 
as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal. 1 (Italics suppl·ied.) 
"In the cause In re Estate of Lynch (Brennan v. 
Lynch), Utah, 254 P.2d 454, we held: 
"'Rule 73, Utah Rules·of Civil Procedure, requires 
an appeal to be taken within one month from the entry 
of the judgment appealed from . . . and that a party 
may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district 
court a notice of appeal. 111 
In In re Estate of Ratliff, 19 Ut 2d 346, 431 P2d 571, 
the Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered March 1, 1966, 
and the Court stated at page 348:. 
"Under Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P., appellant had one 
month from that date or until April 1, 1966, in which 
to file her notice of appeal." 
The Cou~t then goes on the state that the notice of 
appeal was received for filing in the office of the County Clerk 
on April 1, 1966, but inasmuch as it was not accompanied by the 
filing fee, was not filed until a later date. The Court then 
concluded at page 349: 
"Since the notice was filed more than one month 
after the entry of judgment or the order appealed from 
(Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P.), this court lacks jurisdiction 
to entertain the appeal, and is therefore compelled 
to order a dismissal thereof .. " 
Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 596 P2d. 1025 (Utah 
1979) (reversed on other grounds at 607 P2d 836) is a case cited 
by appellant at oral argument in this matter on respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In that case, this 
court held that where the order appealed from was entered in the 
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Register of Actions on July 5, 1978, that notice of appeal 
filed on August 7, 1978, was timely because August 5 was a 
Saturday and appellant therefore had until the following Monday 
in which to file the appeal. We do not see how this helps the 
defendant because in the instant case the one-month period ended 
on a Sunday, and we have conceded that the appellant had until 
the following Monday in which to file the appeal; however, this 
appeal was not filed until two days later, to-wit, on Wednesday. 
At page 1026 of the Albrecht case the Court stated: 
"Respondent states the time commenced to run 
July 5, 1978 (we assume it to have been entered in the 
Register of Actions on that day) , and Notice of Appeal 
was not filed until August 7, 1978. The filing was 
timely because August 5, 1978, fell on a Saturday, 
and the following Monday was the next day not 
excluded by Rule 6, U.R.C.P.· 11 
It should be noted that the Court here again talks in 
terms of filing, not in terms of mailing. 
On page 1027 of the decision in Albrecht, this Court 
states as follows: 
"For example, if the judgment or order appealed 
from were to be entered in the Register of Actions on 
the 6th of July, the last day on which a Notice of 
Appeal could be filed would be the 6th of August, 
unless such 6th of August fell on 'a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday.' In such latter event, 
the period would run 'until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday." 
In addition we refer the Court to the following cases 
which hold in accordance with the foregoing: Peay v. Peay, at 
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607 P2d 841 (Utah 1980), and Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 .P2d 50, 
(Utah 1980). 
Chapter 37 of Title 63, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, is not applicable to filing of appeal in the 
Supreme Court. 
At said oral argument of this matter the defendant 
cited to the court as governing the time for filing notices 
of appeal Chapter 37 of Title 63. The thrust of that chapter 
is that reports, claims and other documents' of the type there 
enumerated are deemed filed when they are postmarked. It also 
provides that the date of registration or certification shall 
be deemed the post-marked date and also provides that such an 
item will be deemed filed if the sender "establishes by compe-
tent evidence' that the item was deposited in the United States 
Mail on or before the date for filing or paying. 
It is clear that Chapter 37 was never intended to 
govern appeals to the Supreme Court. Section 1 thereof states 
that the section is to govern: 
"Any report, claim, tax return, statement or 
other document or any payment required or authorized 
to be filed or made to the state of Utah, or to any 
political subdivision thereof •.. " 
It is clear that that language was never intended to 
encompass the court of the state. "Political subdivision" is 
no doubt intended to have the meaning given to it in the Govern-
mental Immunity Act at Section 63-30-2(2) where it states: 
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"The words 'political subdivision' shall mean any 
county, city, town, school district, special improvement 
or taxing district, or any other political subdivision 
or public corporation~" 
There is considerable authority that the courts have 
inherent rule-making power and that the legislat~re cannot make 
rules for the court any more than the court can make rules for 
the legislature. In the instant case, however, it is not 
necessary to canvass that body of law. The legislature of Utah 
and the courts have concurred in establishing the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Section 78-2-4, UCA, 1953, provides: 
"The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has power 
to prescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for all courts 
of the State of Utah, the forms of process, writs, 
pleadings and motions and the practice and procedure 
in all civil and criminal actions and proceedings, 
including rules of evidence therein, and also divorce, 
probate and guardianship proceedings. Such rules may 
not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights 
of any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme Court 
shall fix the date when such rules shall take effect 
and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith providing 
for procedure in courts only shall be of no further 
force and effect. Nothing in this title, anything 
therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any 
way limit, prescribe or repeal any such rules hereto-
fore prescribed by the Supreme Court." 
Pursuant thereto the Supreme Court adopted the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 63-37-1, et seq., does not 
on its face require that it be interpreted to include proceed-
ings in court. It does not mention courts and in accordance 
with familiar doctrines of statutory interpretation 63-37-1, et 
seq., should be interpreted in such manner as to be consistent 
with Section 78-2-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. See In re Utah 
Savings and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P2d 929 (1968). 
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Furthermore, in accordance with common doctrines of 
statutory interpretation, the language defining the types of 
instruments to be covered by 63-37-1, et seq., must be deter-
mined in accordance with the documents enumerated. Section 
63-37-1 states that: "any report, claim, tax return, statement 
or other documents or any payment" is in effect covered by the 
section and in accordance with the principle of ejusdem generis, 
the "other documents" must of necessity be of the same kind as 
those enumerated, and that would clearly not include court 
pleadings, notices of appeal and the like. (See Anderson v. Utah 
County, 13 Ut 2d 99, 368 P2d 912 (1962].) It would be a stretch 
of the imagination to suppose that the legislature intended in 
63-37-1, et seq., to "take away" what it had "granted" in 78-2-4. 
Furthermore, the rule enunciated in Section 63-37-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, and urged by defendant would be totally 
impractical .and impossible of application in connection with 
appeals to the Supreme Court. That section would allow a liti-
gant, presumably at any time, to come forward with proof thathe 
had mailed a notice of appeal (even a month or so late presum-
ably), and if he could show that he actually mailed it, but that 
it somehow did not arrive at court, he would still be entitled 
to relief. Under this procedure, litigants would never know 
when their case had come to rest and the proceedings terminated. 
Titles to real property would be left up in the air and other 
mischief result. See Norville v. state Tax, 98 Ut 170, 97 P2d 
937 (1940) Head Note #7, page 177. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower 
court is fully supported by the law and the evidence in this 
action and that the Court correctly determined that a directed 
verdict was proper on the question of liability. 
We further respectfully submit that the appeal of the 
defendant-appellant was not timely perfected, that the Court 
lacks jurisdiction, and. that this appeal should, for that 
reason, be dismissed. 
DATED the 
--i /. 
~: day of May, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUM..~INGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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